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Résumé. Cet  article  examine  les  fondements  de  la  théorie  luhmannienne  des 
systèmes sociaux. On s’attachera d’abord à éclaircir la raison de l’intérêt de la théorie 
sociologique pour  la  théorie générale des systèmes. Elle consiste dans  le  fait que 
cette  théorie permet de  concevoir  les  systèmes  sociaux  comme étant  des  entités 
distinctes de  leur environnement et  interréliées par des processus de communica-
tion. On se penchera ensuite sur la différenciation interne des systèmes sociaux en 
soulignant  les  propriétés  fonctionnelles  responsables  de  l’émergence  d’une  plura-
lité de sous-systèmes autonomes,  tels  les  systèmes  légal, politique et économique 















This paper examines the main theoretical reasons underlying the para-
digm shift in social systems theory following Niklas Luhmann’s analysis of 
society as a system of communications. Generally speaking, a system may be 
defined as a chain of operations whose dynamics engender a sui generis entity, 
which should be distinguished from other portions of reality, according to the 
conceptual distinction between system(s) and environment(s).
As for modern systems theory, three phases should be noted. Between 
the 1950s and 1960s, the contributions of Ludwig von Bertanlanffy (1968) 
formed the seminal work in the field. The central interest of this phase was 
the exchanges between systems and their environment. Systems were conceived of 
as open processes, which based their continuance on specific resources derived 
from their environment. The latter provides certain elements (inputs) that are 
transformed following systems’ internal criteria, the results of which (output) 
will affect the environment to some extent.
Between the 1960s and 1970s, systems theory was influenced by 
Heinz von Foerster’s principle of undifferentiated encoding (1982), according to 
which cognitive processes are contingent on autonomous activities within nervous systems. 
For this reason, systems are critically marked by the differences between them 
and the external reality modeled by their environment. All contacts between 
the former and latter are inevitably driven by selective processes depending on a 
specific system’s structures (or programs).
The more recent advances in systems theory, which had a consi-
derable impact on Luhmann’s works, were developed in the 1970s. 
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1981) played a crucial role in the 
paradigm shift at the core of Luhmann’s main conceptual elaborations. They 
use the term autopoiesis (or operative closure) to describe living systems as enti-
ties capable of (re)producing all of their components. Thus, systems exist that are auto-
nomous not only at the level of their structures, but also at the level of their 
operations. Luhmann (1990a, Chapter 1; see also 2013a [2002], Chapter 4) 
adopted this approach by extending it to a plurality of systems: not only living 
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systems, but also psychic and social systems. This relies on the possibility of 
identifying distinctive operations for all of these systems: chemical syntheses in 
the case of living systems; cognitive processes in the case of psychic systems; 
and communications in the case of social systems. 
In the following sections, I focus on social systems as communication 
systems and on the consequences of this kind of conceptualization on the 
building blocks of sociological theory. More precisely, three main aspects 
of Luhmann’s contributions are taken into account, in which the German 
thinker deals with corresponding, crucial areas of sociology. The first aspect 
(section 1) concerns the central issue of the nature of social reality and consists 
of clarifying the specificity of social systems with respect to other entities, 
namely the basic properties which account for differentiation of such systems 
from their environment. I pay attention to the features of the operation of 
communication, which gives rise to the emergence of social systems. 
The second aspect (section  2) has to do with the classical questions 
related to the structure of societies we can observe historically, particularly 
modern and contemporary society. From a systemic approach, such ques-
tions are dealt with by analyzing the main forms associated with the inter-
nal differentiation of social systems. Within this framework, I examine the 
conceptualization of modern and contemporary society as an encompassing 
system organized on the basis of a plurality of functional subsystems such 
as modern law, modern politics, and modern economy. To illustrate their 
features, I rely on the example of the legal system. 
The third aspect (section  3) refers to the fundamental topic of the 
processes underlying social change. Here, the theory identifies, on the 
one hand, the main mechanisms (variation, selection and stabilization) 
responsible for the evolution of society and its subsystems and, on the other, 
certain evolutionary achievements, called structural couplings, that make 
possible the reciprocal coordination of the subsystems themselves. As with 
the previous aspect, I discuss both themes by the examples of the evolution 
of the legal system and the constitution, viewed as the specific structural 
coupling involving the legal system and political system. 
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1. MEANING AND COMMUNICATION IN SOCIAL SYSTEMS
The social reality consists of a plurality of systemic processes whose 
distinctive feature is the basic operation that reproduces their respective 
operative closure (operative Schließerung) and their consequent differentiation 
(Ausdifferenzierung) from other realities. The operation in question is commu-
nication (Luhmann, 1990a, Chapter 1; 1995 [1984], Chapter 4; 2012 [1997], 
Chapter 1). Social systems are formed by sequences of communications referring to and gene-
rated on the basis of other communications. Each communication requires at least two 
co-acting psychic systems, which is by no means tantamount to the transfer 
(input) of psychological states into communicative processes. Indeed, social 
systems and psychic systems correspond to two different kinds of operative 
closures. However, they are not causally isolated, in that both systemic units develop 
within the same medium of meaning and use the medium of language to affect 
each other. Ultimately, each operation of psychic systems (cognitive process) 
and social systems (communication) is selected on the basis of their proper, 
respective chains of internal operations.
Here, the concept of medium, which derives from the contribution of neuro-
physiology (Heider, 2005 [1927]; see also Luhmann, 2000a [1995], Chapter 3; 
2012 [1997], Chapter 2), refers to a set of elements whose combinations generated 
specific forms, such as the empirical case of images within a nervous system 
reproduced on the basis of light waves. Social systems theory identifies two 
main kinds of media: the physical-chemical medium of life and the symbolic 
medium of meaning, which give rise to corresponding forms within biological 
systems and nervous systems, on the one hand, and psychic systems and social 
systems, on the other (Luhmann, 1990a, Chapter 1; 2013a [2002], Chapter 5). 
The medium of meaning embraces all potential references to symbolic contents that both 
psychic systems and social systems can actualize in their operations (i.e. cognitive 
processes and communications). The actual processes of both systems are tanta-
mount to specific combinations (forms) derived from potential symbolic contents 
(medium). The medium of meaning is articulated in three dimensions: factual 
(Sachdimension), social (Sozialdimension), and temporal (Zeitdimension). They consist of 
references, respectively, to certain identities, ego’s social perspectives, and certain 
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points in time, which are drawn from non-actualized (potential) identities, 
non-actualized (potential) perspectives, and non-actualized (potential) instants 
(Luhmann, 1990a: Chapter 2; 1995 [1984], Chapter 2; 2013a [2002], Chapter 4). 
Language can also be analyzed as a medium. Its elements are signs of a different 
nature (e.g. sounds in oral communication, and letters in the case of writing) 
and endowed with meanings, which combine and bring about forms such as 
words, sentences, and texts. Though psychic systems can use language within 
the more enveloping processes of consciousness, social systems have to use 
language to reproduce their differentiation (i.e. operative closure). Under 
these circumstances, language functions as a mechanism for reciprocally 
channeling stimuli between the co-evolving systems of psychic processes 
and communications. This justifies describing all linguistic devices as a parti-
cular case of the general concept of structural coupling (strukturelle Kopplung). 
All structural couplings make possible coordination and mutual influence 
between two systemic units alongside (and in spite of) the maintenance of 
their respective operative closure. In the case of language, the two systemic 
units involved are consciousness and social systems (Luhmann 2012 [1997], 
Chapters 1 and 2; see also Luhmann 2013a [2002], Chapter 2). 
The consciousness itself is one type of system that constitutes each indivi-
dual, the other being a specific case of biological system. Both are non-commu-
nicative realities, in that their operative closure depends on mechanisms other 
than communications: cognitive processes and chemical syntheses, respectively. 
Therefore, individuals as such are conceived of as part of the environment of social systems, 
which does not imply the irrelevance of individuals, but the opposite. Indeed, 
according to this theoretical perspective, the autonomy of each human being is 
emphatically recognized with respect to a plurality of other systemic processes, 
including social systems. This is rooted in the operative closures of the orga-
nic system associated with each body, on the one hand, and the differentiated 
neural circuits underlying human consciousness, on the other (Edelman and 
Tononi, 2000). As stated by Luhmann: 
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We are dealing with social, not psychic systems. We assume that social 
systems are not composed of psychic systems, let alone of bodily human 
beings. Therefore, psychic systems belong to the environment of social 
systems. Of course, they are part of the environment that is especially rele-
vant for the formation of social systems. […] Such environmental relevance 
for the construction of social systems constrains what is possible, but it does 
not prevent social systems from forming themselves autonomously and on 
the basis of their own elemental operations. These are communications—not 
psychic processes per se, and also not the processes of consciousness. […] [A] 
theory of self-referential autopoietic social systems provokes the question of 
psychic systems’ self-referential autopoiesis and with it the question of how 
psychic systems can establish their self-reproduction, the “stream” of their 
“conscious life”, from one moment to the next so that its closure is compatible 
with an environment of social systems (Luhmann, 1995 [1984], p.255-257).
As with the systemic realities that form human beings, social systems 
consist of differentiated and emergent syntheses (i.e. communications), though 
they inevitably presuppose the involvement of psychic units and the organic 
substrate of biological systems, which also means that no system can exist 
without its environment. Each communication is generated when an alter’s 
observation (termed understanding, Verstehen) refers to any gesture, sound, or 
sign (i.e. any utterance, Mitteilung), imputing it to an ego and associating it with 
any meaning, called information (Information). To achieve the specific reality 
of communication, these three components are necessary. Here, the alter’s 
understanding plays a crucial role; it triggers a communicative synthesis by 
detecting something as a message (i.e. the ego’s utterance) associated with some 
meaning (i.e. information). This implies that the alter identifies an event that 
can be traced back to his or her language. In this sense, the medium of a 
language (shared by both the ego and the alter) represents the basic pre-requi-
site for the emergence of communication. 
No social system comprises only one communication. As with other systems, social systems 
come about only if a network (process) unfolds, connecting a plurality of communica-
tive syntheses on the basis of reciprocal understanding by at least two psychic 
systems of their utterance/information. At the same time, such a connection 
can be described as a form of self-observation concerning the internal dyna-
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mics of social systems. Indeed, a crucial thesis is that social systems are not 
only autopoietic systems, because of their capacity to trigger communications from 
other communications, but also self-observing (i.e. auto-referential) systems, in that 
each communicative synthesis is recognized as such within the same systemic 
network. This identification is the system’s performance and is possible only if 
a communication implicitly or explicitly refers to the difference between utte-
rance and information resulting from a previous communication. 
This kind of reference within the communicative flow is termed basal 
self-reference (basale Selbstreferenz) (Luhmann, 1990a, Chapter  1; 1995 [1984], 
Chapter 4; 2013a [2002], Chapter 6; see also Esposito, 1993; 1999). Each alter’s 
understanding that co-occurs along with a network of communications consti-
tutes the junction between two directly linked communications where, at  the 
same time, the basal self-reference is actuated by imputing each communicative 
unit to the ego’s utterance. In other words, the proper self of social systems 
derives from a reduction (concomitant with the move from one communication 
to another) of the complexity underlying each communicative synthesis to the 
punctuated event of the ego’s utterance. As argued earlier, the latter is distin-
guished from and associated with an information, which plays the role of the 
external reference for the system.
This form of reduction has crucial implications for the conceptualization of 
social systems. Although all communications involve a specific combination of 
both the ego and the alter’s perspectives—which bring about a sui generis entity 
irreducible to either the alter’s understanding or ego’s utterance alone—an equally 
constitutive mechanism accompanies the reproduction of social systems, namely 
imputation of the highly sophisticated reality of communication to the univo-
cal component of the ego’s action (i.e. his or her utterance). Such a mecha-
nism, which drives the self-observation of social systems, has the advantage 
that actions can be recognized and treated more easily than communications, which makes it 
simpler to identify the complexity of the latter in the flow of time. All action theories adapt 
to and reinforce such a self-simplification of social systems, insofar as they tend 
to characterize the elements of these systems in terms of individual beha-
viors, ignoring the specific, interactional dynamics that give rise to communicative processes. 
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This crucial epistemological aspect underlying the foundation of social theory is 
clearly stated since Luhmann’s early contributions to a new social systems theory: 
Confronted with the question of elementary units [of social systems], most socio-
logists would come up with the answer: action. Sometimes “roles” or even human 
individuals are preferred. Since Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, however, action 
theory seems to offer the most advanced conceptualization. Communication is 
introduced as a kind of action—e.g. as “kommunikatives Handeln” in the sense 
of Jürgern Habermas. […]. For a theory of autopoietic systems, only communi-
cation is a serious candidate for the position of the elementary units of the basic 
self-referential process of social systems. Only communication is necessarily and 
inherently social; action is not. Moreover, social action implies communication, 
implies at least the communication of the meaning of the action or the intent of 
the actor; but it also implies the communication of the definition of the situation, 
of the expectation of being understood and accepted, and so on and so forth. 
And above all, communication is not a kind of action because it always contains 
a far richer meaning than uttering or sending messages alone. […] [T]he perfec-
tion of communication implies understanding, and understanding is not part of 
the activity of the communicator and cannot be attributed to him. Therefore, 
the theory of autopoietic social systems requires a conceptual revolution within 
sociology: the replacement of action theory by communication theory as charac-
terization of the elementary operative level of the system (Luhmann, 1990a, p.6).
In addition to the ego and alter sharing a common language, a second condi-
tion for the emergence of communication is the alter’s actual observation (i.e. 
his or her understanding) of the ego’s utterance. The physical co-presence of 
both ego and alter is certainly the most effective solution, but it reduces the 
opportunities for communication considerably. More advanced devices for the trans-
mission of communicative messages have resulted from the evolution of society, such as 
writing, the printing press, telephone, the radio, television, and computers. As 
with language, these devices may be examined as further empirical cases of the 
concept of medium—one example being writing, whose elements (i.e. letters 
and words) combine to create countless forms with their own meanings. The 
enormous potential for the re-combination of units of meaning and the spatial 
and/or temporal separation between utterance and understanding they consti-
tutively entail are both crucial factors responsible for the increasing variety of 
communication and constant awareness of its contingency.
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Finally, a third problem should be mentioned. Once a communicative 
unit is synthesized on the basis of the transmission of a message and its 
understanding, the improbability of the utterance being accepted is the major obstacle 
for building any social order. Such an improbability is contingent on the 
binary coding (yes/no) of language and inevitably a source of uncertainty for ego’s 
expectations that his or her communicative messages will be accepted by 
alter, which, in turn, makes the reproduction of ordered and increasingly 
advanced social networks (e.g. decisions within organizations) problematic. 
In addition, the risk of ego’s utterances being refused by alter would discou-
rage the former’s decision to embark on interactions with the latter. 
To deal with the improbability of the acceptance of communication, 
devices termed generalized media of interchange originally by Talcott 
Parsons (1963a; 1963b; 1968; 1975) or symbolically generalized communication 
media (symbolish generalisierte Kommunikationsmedien) according to Luhmann (1976; 
2012 [1997], Chapter 2) have emerged as outcomes of the societal evolution: 
values (Werte), truth (Wahrheit), love (Liebe), money (Geld), art (Kunst), power 
(Macht), and legal validity (Rechtsgeltung). Considered specifically from a func-
tionalist perspective, all of these media are functional equivalents or alternatives, 
insofar as each of them facilitates the consensus of the alter with respect to 
several forms of communication (i.e. the ego’s utterance).
2. INTERNAL DIFFERENTIATION OF 
SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND MODERN SOCIETY
The concept of internal differentiation (Differenzierung) concerns the processes 
that generate differences between system and environment within systems themselves, inclu-
ding social systems. With special reference to the evolution of society, four 
types of differentiation can be identified historically (Luhmann 2012 [1997], 
Chapter 4). First, segmentary differentiation is the fundamental principle underlying 
the structures of old societies, which are consequently divided into a series of 
similar components, such as kinship units, villages, and tribes. 
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The second type of differentiation is based on the difference between center and 
periphery; for example, the structure of the Roman empire, in which societal 
communication is modeled by the twofold reference to dominant roles and 
institutions and those subject to the center’s supremacy. Thirdly, stratification 
consists of a hierarchy of strata or classes and is the main mechanism responsible 
for the societal differentiation between the collapse of the Roman empire and 
the beginning of the early modern period. Finally, the typical organizational 
principle of modern and contemporary society is functional differentiation, in which 
various units, called functional subsystems (e.g. modern politics centered on the 
state, a modern economy guided by the market, modern science, and modern 
art), have achieved their own autonomy (Luhmann, 1998 [1992], Chapter 1). 
Generally, the consolidation of these subunits within modern society requires 
the autonomous reproduction of distinctive roles and criteria associated with 
the fulfillment of their respective social function. Such a requirement is called 
functional specification, which is illustrated by the example of modern law.
Unlike pre-modern instances of normative binding, the law of a functio-
nally differentiated society is tantamount to a network of decisional processes 
depending exclusively on principles and procedures applied by determinate 
professionals such as judges, excluding the interference of exogenous normative 
constraints associated with other social spheres (Luhmann, 1981, Chapters 2 
and 4; 2004 [1993], Chapter 2). Stated succinctly, the social function of those 
decisional processes consists of the stabilization of normative expectations, 
namely the process of fixing in advance and protecting social expectations that 
individuals should assume as legitimate (i.e. legal). More specifically: 
The hypothesis, which we will set out in detail here, holds that law solves a problem 
in relation to time. […] We see the social meaning of law in the fact that there 
are social consequences if expectations can be secured as stable expectations over 
time. […] Time binding prejudices social partiality. […] In general terms […] time 
binding is not be achieved without social costs. […] Here we conceived of law as a 
form which is related to the tensions between the temporal and the social dimen-
sions and which makes it possible to cope with them even under conditions of 
an evolutionary rise of social complexity. […] Abstractly, law deals with the costs 
of the time binding of expectations. Concretely, law deals with function of the 
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stabilization of normative expectations by regulating how they are generalized in 
relation to their temporal, factual, and social dimensions (Luhmann, 2004 [1993], 
p.142-148; see also Teubner, 1993; King and Thornhill, 2003). 
Another example is the function of the political system based on the 
modern state, which is fulfilled by making decisions that are collectively 
binding (Luhmann, 2000b, Chapter 3). The function of modern science is the 
establishment of criteria for deciding the truth/falsehood of new knowledge 
(Luhmann, 1990b, Chapter 5), whereas the system of mass media performs 
the function of providing a memory for society (Luhmann, 2000c [1995], 
Chapter 13; see also Esposito, 2002). These and all other functional subsystems 
(see Luhmann, 2000a [1995]; 2013b [2000]; 2002) have the same relevance 
to the reproduction of the communicative system of modern society. Instead 
of a hierarchy of subsystems, their relationships give rise to a heterarchical and 
polycentric order (Luhmann 2012 [1997], Chapter 4]. At the same time, any static, 
mechanical, and determinist approach to the analysis of social order should be 
inevitably replaced by paying attention to the proper contingency that affects 
all functional subsystems and can be viewed as the “modern society’s defining 
attribute” (Luhmann, 1998 [1992], Chapter 3).
The second fundamental requirement for achieving functional differentiation 
is the existence in each subsystem of a specific binary coding for all of its internal opera-
tions (communications) (Luhmann, 2012 [1997], Chapters 2 and 4). For example, 
the binary coding of the legal system is the distinction between legal/illegal 
(Recht/Unrecht) (Luhmann, 2004 [1993], Chapter 4), whereas, with the political 
system, it is the distinction between power superiority  /  power inferiority 
(Machtüberlegenheit/Machtunterlegenheit) (Luhmann, 2000b, Chapter  3). The diffe-
rentiation and autonomy of these and all other subsystems are possible if all of 
their respective operations refer to the same question of which side (positive or negative) of the same 
coding should be applied while observing a plurality of circumstances (e.g. events, 
behaviors, and other communicative processes) on the basis of each subsystem’s 
interests, such as communications of certain normative expectations in the case 
of the legal system, or certain theories in the case of the system of science.
Domenico Tosini : Why communication?202
More precisely, the application of each binary coding consists of observing 
whether such circumstances correspond to a series of constraints established in 
the respective subsystem. As for the example of the legal system, “the positive 
value is applied if a fact conforms to the norms of the system. The negative value is 
applied if a fact violates a norm of the system. A ‘fact’ here is a construction of the 
system.” (Luhmann, 2004 [1993], p.183). This does not mean that the legal code is 
self-sufficient. On the contrary:  “Since the values legal and illegal are not in them-
selves criteria for decisions between legal and illegal, there must be further points 
of view that indicate whether or not and how the values of the code are to be 
allocated rightly or wrongly” (Luhmann, 2004 [1993], p.192). This implies that, empi-
rically, the allocation of code values depends on specific structures, the programs 
of law. They always assume the form of conditional programming (as opposed to 
purpose-specific programs, which are at work, for example, in the case of decision-
making aimed at specific consequences and driven by cost-benefit calculations): 
The conditional programme made it possible to differentiate a binary 
coded system by assuming the function of regulating the coordination 
of code-values to cases in that system. Even then the formula “if—then” 
remained. The conditional programme spells out the conditions on which it 
depends, whether something is legal or illegal. With these conditions it refers 
to past facts, which are stated in the present. This can include legal facts, for 
instance, by means of the question whether a statute has been passed vali-
dity and if so when. Here it is crucial that the attribution of the values legal 
and illegal depends on what can be treated as past at the moment of the 
decision. In this respect law always operates as an ex-post-facto, tandem-
arranged system. […] What the form of conditional programme does it to 
prevent any future facts, not accounted for at the time of the decision, from 
being relevant to a decision concerning legal and illegal. […] The linkage of 
the legal system to the form of conditional  programme is a consequence of 
the function of law, namely the stabilization of contra-factual expectations. 
Expectations are turned into the form of norms in precisely those cases when 
they are not met. This substitution of certainty (of expectations) for uncer-
tainty (of realization) requires structural compensations. What is more, one 
cannot make it contingent on the future whether the expectations to which 
one has to commit oneself now will be legitimate in the future. One needs to 
know now or at the moment of the decision, and this can only be achieved 
in the form of a conditional programme (Luhmann, 2004 [1993], p.197-200). 
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The programs of law include all the principles, statutes, rulings, and legal 
proceedings presumed as legally valid according to decisions referring to the same 
coding. Programming in a legal way is equivalent to making use of the distinc-
tion between legal and illegal on the basis of specific limitations, already stated to 
be valid. Importantly, any reference to the binary coding legal/illegal inevitably 
calls for a test based on the programs of law. Put differently, all uses of the legal 
coding stimulate other communications resorting to the programs of law, which 
inspect the validity of claims about the legal/illegal nature of certain normative 
expectations. This creates a network of operations forming the law’s autopoiesis or 
operative closure. Here, legal validity can be conceptualized as the proper medium of 
the legal system, which parallels other symbolically generalized communication 
media mentioned in the previous section (see Luhmann, 2004 [1993], Chapter 2). 
Finally, all functional subsystems develop their own semantics of self-description, 
namely concepts and theories through which their communications aim to formu-
late representations of themselves (Luhmann, 2012 [1997], Chapter 5). In the case 
of the legal system, this can be exemplified by the numerous attempts to capture 
the essence of law by referring to either concepts, such as justice, or connotations, 
such as natural and constitutional law. By adopting a comparative perspective 
concerning different stages in the evolution of society, one of the most significant 
tasks of systems theory is to clarify the correlations between the semantics and structure of 
each respective stage of society and, more specifically, between the semantics and 
the subsystems of society in which the former is elaborated (Luhmann, 1980).
3. EVOLUTIONARY MECHANISMS AND  
STRUCTURAL COUPLINGS OF THE FUNCTIONAL SUBSYSTEMS
Generally speaking, the theory of evolution is the area of systems theory 
concerned with the way systems transform their structures alongside sophis-
ticated interactions between them and their environment. One can speak of 
evolution if three mechanisms occur: variation, selection, and stabilization 
(Luhmann, 2012 [1997], Chapter 3). Evolution is possible only if something 
new is inserted into the system’s structures, which requires variation in the previous 
reproduction of the system. Any variation concerns the single elements (operations) 
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of the system and looks like a proposal to change the normal course of the 
system’s processes, which are guided by its structures. Referring to social 
systems in general one has to understand that their structures are made 
up of expectations. Therefore, a variation is observed if communications 
occur which contrasts with a given set of expectations assumed, for example, 
within specific interactional or organizational contexts. Comparable mecha-
nisms affect all subsystems of modern society. In the case of the legal system, 
for example, its own variations consist of communications in favor of norms 
that oppose those recognized by the law currently in force. Put differently, 
legal variation is tantamount to the communication of unexpected normative 
expectations (Luhmann, 2004 [1993], Chapter 6). To give another example, 
the analogous mechanism of variation in the system of modern science is 
to communicate theories that contradicts previous statements assumed to 
be true. Similar mechanisms are also part of the evolution of politics, the 
economy, art, mass media, education, and religion. 
As a variation occurs, an additional mechanism has to determine whether 
it can be recognized as a binding operation for the subsequent processes of 
the system. This mechanism is termed selection. In this sense, selection is 
concerned with the structures guiding (i.e. binding) the development of systems, namely 
their programs. As the variation gives rise to new possibilities for modifying 
systems, the task of selection is to opt for either the insertion of such possibi-
lities into the structures of the system (positive selection) or, conversely, the 
rejection of such an insertion (negative selection). Considering once again 
the case of social systems, one can identify selective processes for all func-
tional subsystems of modern society. For example, with regard to the legal 
system the respective mechanism of selection is made up of the set of legal 
proceedings and norms of competence related to specific roles (i.e.  judges, 
and legislators), which discriminate between normative expectations to be 
supported and those to be challenged. Similar procedures exist for the system 
of modern science; they consist of research methods concerning scientific 
debates within the medium of truth, in which specific theories must be 
judged to be either verified (i.e. not yet confuted) or confuted.
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After new programs for system reproduction have been positively selec-
ted for transfer into the system’s structures, problems related to internal compatibility 
or consistency are always possible between the new and other older programs. 
Consequently, to achieve the system’s evolution effectively, it is necessary to 
overcome incompatibilities and inconsistencies. This function is fulfilled by 
the process of (re-)stabilization, which can be understood as being an overall 
re-organization of systems. Only if this succeeds can one definitively speak of 
evolutionary achievements. Once again, this process can be detected within all subsys-
tems of modern society. In the case of the legal system, for example, this task is 
performed by the activities of the higher courts together with the elaboration of 
the doctrine. In terms of the recent consolidation of new kinds of non-econo-
mic losses in both civil law and common law, it has been necessary to engage 
not only positive selection by legal proceedings, such as rulings by certain 
courts, but also complex analyses of and solution to problems of consistency 
determined by the tense relations between these new forms of losses and the 
previous principles of the law of tort. Similar to the legal system and all other 
subsystems of modern society, science has experienced numerous examples of 
internal re-organization corresponding to different paradigm changes, such as 
those described by Thomas Kuhn in his theory of scientific revolutions (1961). 
All of these processes presuppose the maintenance of the autonomy of each 
evolving subsystem as an independent network of communications. However, 
functional subsystems should not be viewed as entities causally isolated from each other. As 
with all circumstances of the relationship between a system and its environ-
ment, and other systems belonging to the environment itself, certain forms 
of connections—previously referred to as structural couplings—may be identified. 
Considering the examples of the legal system and political system, the constitu-
tion might be characterized as the structural coupling specifically responsible for 
their interactions (Luhmann, 2004 [1993], Chapter 10; see also Thornhill, 2010). 
Other similar mechanisms determine the relationships between other subsys-
tems of modern society. The property and contracts exemplify forms of struc-
tural coupling between the legal system and economic system (Luhmann, 2004 
[1993], Chapter 10). As for the structural couplings between the economic system 
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and political system, it can be seen in the establishment of the reserve bank and 
in the taxes, which make it possible to constrain to some extent the circulation 
of money politically (Luhmann, 2012 [1997], Chapter 4).
Each structural coupling is responsible for the exchange of resources and 
reciprocal influences between the subsystems involved. We know that the 
subsystems’ autonomy associated with functional differentiation gives rise 
to the pretension to base their decision-making on the internal chains of 
their communicative processes. However, this approach leads to a paradox, 
termed the self-reference problem, which is exemplified by the case of the consti-
tution as follows (Luhmann, 1990c).
As for the legal system, its self-reference problem derives from its search for 
the legal (i.e. internal) foundation of its decision-making. On the one hand, its 
autonomy entails that modern law should dispense with resorting to non-legal 
(i.e. external) principles. This constraint generates a paradox once it becomes 
necessary to justify the legal validity of the ultimate decision supporting and 
validating all legal decision-making. This would require marking the original 
and valid distinction between legal and illegal, from which all other decisions 
draw their validity. Logically, this attempt at the self-foundation of law can be 
characterized as an application of the binary coding of legal/illegal to itself. 
Because of the impracticability of a regressus ad infinitum depending on this 
recursive internal foundation of each legal decision, a certain degree of arbi-
trariness is inevitable when confronting the question of whether marking 
certain expectations as legal or illegal is itself legal or illegal—this being 
particularly apparent for decisions establishing a constitution. In this case, 
the regress is halted and the arbitrariness is neutralized through reference 
to some exceptional decision-making, which in turn is legitimized by some 
unquestionable (paramount) principle, such as the will of the nation or 
people. In fact, this reference is no longer a purely legal solution, but also a political 
act, which shows how the legal system relies on political resources to over-
come its own self-reference problem.
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Similar problems affect the political system due to its internal reflection on 
the sovereignty of political decision-making. As with the legal system, the auto-
nomy of the political system demands reference only to its own binding deci-
sions. A network of systemic operations with a hierarchical structure unfolds, 
in which any binding decision (qualified as such inside the political system) 
has power superiority over certain other, subordinated decisions. A corres-
ponding self-reference problem arises if it becomes necessary to establish the 
power superiority of the political decisions that identify themselves as sove-
reign over (i.e. binding on) all other decisions. 
Even this attempt at self-foundation by the political system can be charac-
terized as the application of its binary coding (i.e. power superiority / power 
inferiority) to itself, which entails, as with the legal system, a respective para-
dox. Also in this case, a regressus ad infinitum depending on the internal foun-
dation of each decision is impracticable. For this reason, a certain degree of 
arbitrariness is inevitable when dealing with the question of whether marking 
decisions derived from certain political bodies as legitimately or illegitimately 
sovereign (i.e. endowed with or devoid of power superiority) is itself either 
legitimate or illegitimate. Anyone who had the capacity to establish his or her 
sovereignty regardless of its legitimacy would have gained the most powerful 
position (binding all others), though by acting in a purely arbitrary way. Like 
the move of the legal system towards the political system, such a risk of arbi-
trariness is neutralized by invoking special prerogatives such as those associa-
ted with the classic doctrine of the constituent power, which proves the need for 
legal support outside the political system to solve its own self-reference problem:
In sum, we can say that the constitution provides political solutions for the 
problem of the self-reference of the legal system and legal solutions for the 
problems of the self-reference of the political system. […] The constitu-
tion, which constitutes and defines the state, has a correspondingly different 
meaning in both systems. For the legal system it is a supreme statute, a basic 
law. For the political system it is an instrument of politics, in the double sense 
of both instrumental politics (which changes state of affairs) and symbolic 
politics (which does not). […] What was in practice set in train is the story of 
the effects of mutual irritations, which in the long term affect the directions 
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in which the coupled systems develop by building and removing structures. 
The political system is subject to self-irritation by the possibility of stimulating 
a change in law. The positivization of law provides an immense potential for 
political action, and politics is continuously engaged in the selection of such 
possibilities. […] The legal system is likewise exposed to political initiatives with 
which it has to deal in legislative procedures, administrative regulations, and 
legal decision-making (including the decision-making of constitutional courts) 
on an ongoing basis. […] The legal system exposes itself to political influences by 
providing the possibilities for legislation. In democratizing, the political system 
exposes itself to the appeal of bringing the initiatives for a change in law to a 
head. The self-reference of the system thus takes a detour via the inclusion of the 
environment in the system (Luhmann, 2004 [1993], p.410-412).
Therefore, as with the stabilization of all structural couplings, the conso-
lidation of any constitution engenders permanent mechanisms of reciprocal 
influence between the systems involved. On the one hand, the influence of the 
legal system over the political system consists of the attempt to make political 
decisions compatible with proceedings and other constraints set up within the 
legal system itself (an approach embodied by the principle of the rule of law). 
On the other hand, the influence of politics over the legal system is dependent, 
to a certain degree, on the power of the former to change legislation on the 
basis of expectations resulting from the dynamics and decision-making of poli-
tical parties and other political actors. Analogous mechanisms are also at work 
in relationships underlying the structural couplings between other subsystems 
of the modern and contemporary, functionally differentiated society.
CONCLUSION
The article intended to analyze the main theoretical principles concerning 
Niklas Luhmann’s contribution to social systems theory. First, I clarified the 
reasons underlying the attempt to extend certain elaborations within the gene-
ral theory of systems (particularly the notion of operative closure) to the social 
reality. Such an extension is contingent on the idea that social systems are diffe-
rentiated from their environment, including the biological systems and psychic 
systems whose combination generates human beings, on the basis of the specific 
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operation of communication. Certainly, the latter derives from the involvement 
of psychic systems, but it is not reducible to them. Communication is a sui generis 
synthesis of the ego’s utterance and alter’s observation (understanding) of the 
distinction between such an utterance and its reference to some symbolic content 
(information). The description of social systems as systems of actions is tantamount 
to reducing the complexity of communication to the first component (the ego’s 
utterance), which is also a typical, internal performance of social systems them-
selves that make it simpler to identify communication in the flow of time, insofar 
as actions can be recognized and treated more easily than communications. 
In addition, the article discussed two other sets of theoretical principles 
within systems theory. On the one hand, the internal differentiation of social 
systems was examined, focusing on a series of forms of differentiation that have 
historically affected the fundamental structure of society, from the segmentary 
form and center/periphery differentiation to those based on stratification and, 
in the more recent evolutionary phase of modernity, the functional specification 
responsible for the emergence of a plurality of autonomous subsystems, such as 
modern law, modern science, and modern art. On the other hand, the investi-
gation of the main mechanisms underlying social evolution may be identified 
among the most important research interests of social systems theory. Following a 
neo-evolutionary approach, the theory distinguishes processes of variation, selec-
tion, and stabilization for all functionally differentiated subsystems of modern 
society, as well as specific devices, called structural couplings, that reciprocally 
coordinate those subsystems. The example of the constitution was analyzed as 
the structural connection between the legal system and political system.
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